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Incentive schemes are increasingly used to motivate the supply of ecosystem services from
agro-ecosystems through changes in land use and management. Here, I synthesize the
complex effects of incentives on ecosystem services through their influence on land use and
management. Linkages between incentives and land use change, and between land use
change and ecosystem services can be one-to-many, many-to-one, and many-to-many.
Change in land use and management can affect multiple ecosystem services, with both co-
benefits and trade-offs. Incentives can motivate multiple changes in land use and manage-
ment and multiple incentives often interact with both synergies and tensions in their effect
upon ecosystem services. These vary over both space and time, and can be non-linear.
Depending on incentive design, changes in ecosystem service supply can also have a
feedback effect on incentive prices. I suggest that continued quantitative development is
required to further explore these linkages: in the influence of incentives on land use change;
in the impact of land use change on ecosystem services, and; in ecosystem service supply
feedbacks on incentive prices. Quantifying and understanding these linkages is essential to
progress more comprehensive analyses of the impact of incentives on ecosystem services,
and the design of incentives capable of realizing synergies and avoiding tensions.
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Services from agro-ecosystems include a range of provisioning
(e.g., food, fresh water, and bioenergy), regulating (e.g.,
climate, erosion, and pests), supporting (e.g., biogeochemical
cycling, biodiversity/habitat), and cultural (e.g., recreation and
education) services (Power, 2010; Swinton et al., 2007).
Agricultural land use has degraded the soil, water, and
biological assets in agro-ecosystems to such an extent that
the restoration of natural capital and rehabilitation of
ecosystem services through changes in land use and manage-
ment is now a global priority (Ehrlich et al., 2012; Foley et al.,
2011; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). A primary* Tel.: +61 8 8303 8581; fax: +61 8 8303 8582.
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.reason for this degradation is the failure of agricultural
commodity markets to internalize environmental costs
associated with land use and management decisions (Lant
et al., 2008). New market-based policy instruments – particu-
larly financial incentives such as payments for ecosystem
services – have emerged to redress these market failures
(Farley and Costanza, 2010). Whilst market-based incentives
remain one of the great hopes for the restoration of ecosystem
services (Daily et al., 2009; Pascual and Perrings, 2007), the
potential for inefficiencies and negative outcomes has also
been recognized (Frame, 2011; Kinzig et al., 2011).
In agro-ecosystems, incentives influence ecosystem ser-
vices through motivating changes in land use and manage-
ment (Fig. 1). This chain of influence is complex because
Fig. 1 – A simple conceptual representation of the linkages between incentives, land use, and ecosystem services. Financial
incentives can have synergies (positive) and tensions (negative) in changing land use and management – which in turn
have a range of co-benefits (positive) and trade-offs (negative) across multiple ecosystem services. Relationships between
incentives and land use, and between land use and ecosystem services, vary across space and time and can be non-linear.
These relationships can also be many-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many. The bottom link represents the potential
dynamic effect of changes in supply of ecosystem services on incentive prices.
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changes in land use and management, each potentially
having co-benefits and trade-offs across multiple ecosystem
services (May and Spears, 2012). More often than not, multiple
incentives co-exist (Pittock, 2011; Schrobback et al., 2011).
These incentives interact, providing price signals for multiple
land use and management changes, thereby compounding the
effect on ecosystem services (Deal et al., 2012). Hence, the
linkages between incentives and land use, and between land
use and ecosystem services can be one-to-many, many-to-
one, or many-to-many. These effects are typically heteroge-
neous across both space and time, and can be non-linear
(Holland et al., 2011; Laterra et al., 2012). Changes in the supply
of ecosystem services may also have a dynamic feedback
effect on incentive prices, depending on instrument design.
Understanding these effects can lead to substantial gains in
the efficiency of policy and management in agro-ecosystems
(White et al., 2012) and avoid negative outcomes (Bryan and
Crossman, submitted for publication). Whilst many recent
studies have addressed individual components, none have
attempted the integrated assessment of incentive interactions
on land use and ecosystem services inclusive of all of the
linkages depicted in Fig. 1.
Here, I explore, clarify, and synthesize current understand-
ing of the complex and multifarious influence of market-based
incentives on land use and ecosystem services. I also discuss
the requirements for quantifying these interactions and
suggest directions for future work to support this important
task. Awareness of these linkages is necessary to realize the
benefits and avoid adverse outcomes for ecosystem services
from changes in land use and management motivated by
market-based incentives.2. Incentives for ecosystem services
Ecosystem services contribute to human well-being
through a range of direct-use (e.g., food and recreation),
indirect-use (e.g., insurance and option), and non-use (e.g.,
existence, intrinsic and bequest) values (Pascual and
Perrings, 2007). Whether or not the value of ecosystem
services is reflected in markets depends on the rivalness of
the good/service consumption (whether their use precludes
use by others) and its excludability (whether access can be
restricted to those who pay) (Kemkes et al., 2010). Some
market goods, such as agricultural crops and livestock, are
rival and excludable, and are routinely valued and traded in
markets (Farley, 2008). Public goods (e.g., biodiversity), on the
other hand, are non-rival and non-excludable; common pool
resources (e.g., fisheries) are rival and non-excludable, and;
club goods (e.g., toll access to a nature park) are non-rival
and excludable (Kemkes et al., 2010). Markets for public
goods and common pool resources rarely emerge naturally
and, as farmers do not receive a price signal for these non-
market ecosystem services, they under-produce them
(Ribaudo et al., 2010).
Market-based incentives aim to correct this market failure
and manage the supply of public good and common-pool type
ecosystem services (Farley and Costanza, 2010). To be
effective, incentives need to be supported by a carefully
designed regulatory framework (e.g., safe minimum stan-
dards, quantifiable units of service provision, clearly defined
property rights, monitoring requirements, and contractual
arrangements) (Kroeger and Casey, 2007). Properly supported
by regulation, financial incentives can be used to motivate the
Fig. 2 – Complex influence of two land management
changes in a wheat cropping system – stubble residue
removal and nitrogen fertilizer application – on the soil
organic carbon (SOC) storage ecosystem service in
Australia’s wheat-growing regions (Zhao et al., submitted
for publication). This provides an example of the right
hand side linkages in Fig. 1. Rates of change in SOC are
median values across the region. SOC can maintained or
increased through the application of I40 kg/ha of
nitrogen and =35% removal of stubble residue.
Decreasing nitrogen application rates =50 kg/ha result in
a sharp decrease in SOC at removal rates =25%.
Increasing nitrogen application rates does little to improve
SOC at higher stubble removal rates.
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private individuals (Farley, 2008).
There are many different types of incentives for ecosystem
services emerging at a range of scales (Farley and Costanza,
2010). These are commonly termed payments for ecosystem
services or agri-environment schemes, and can be implemented
through a range of instruments such as direct payments/
rewards, tax incentives, cap and trade markets, voluntary
markets, auctions, and certification programs (Pascual and
Perrings, 2007; Pirard, 2012; Shelley, 2011; Yang et al., 2010).
Globally, many such schemes have been implemented (Tallis
et al., 2008). In any given region, multiple incentives – from
global commodity markets to locally implemented incentives
for public good and common pool resources – may co-exist for
governing the production of ecosystem services.
3. Land use and ecosystem services
The type, intensity, and spatial arrangement of land use and
management critically affects the type and amount of
ecosystem services produced in agro-ecosystems (Goldstein
et al., 2012; Raudsepp-Hearne et al., 2010). Changes in land use
alter service provision (Dale and Polasky, 2007; Metzger et al.,
2006; Nelson et al., 2010) either directly, or indirectly through
effects on related services (Bennett et al., 2009). Multiple
changes in land use and management can interact and
influence individual ecosystem services. For example,
changes in fertilizer application rates and stubble residue
management in wheat cropping have been found to strongly
affect soil carbon (Zhao et al., submitted for publication)
(Fig. 2).
Similarly, individual changes in land use and management
often affect multiple ecosystem services (Bennett et al., 2009;
Bullock et al., 2011). Ecosystem service changes may be
positively correlated such that changes in land use either
increases or decreases their provision (Raudsepp-Hearne
et al., 2010). Between these services, co-benefits can occur
and the potential for win–win outcomes is greatest, but lose-
lose outcomes are also possible (Tallis et al., 2008). However,
negative correlations in ecosystem service changes may also
occur (Raudsepp-Hearne et al., 2010). Trade-offs exist between
these services whereby land use change can increase provi-
sion of one service, but only at the expense of others. Co-
benefits and trade-offs can occur over multiple spatial and
temporal scales (Power, 2010; Rodriguez et al., 2006) and vary
over both space (Larsen et al., 2011) and time (Holland et al.,
2011). Several win–win outcomes have been reported (Fig. 3a
and b) (Dwyer et al., 2009), especially through the spatial
targeting of hotspots of ecosystem service provision (Cross-
man and Bryan, 2009; Nelson et al., 2009). However, win–win
opportunities are often hard to realize and trade-offs are the
norm (Hirsch et al., 2011; Tallis et al., 2008).
A typical trade-off in agro-ecosystems is the replacement
of many supporting, regulating, habitat, and cultural services
provided by natural ecosystems for food, fiber, and increas-
ingly, bio-energy services generated through agricultural
production (Bennett and Balvanera, 2007; Lant et al., 2008).
For example, specific trade-offs have been found between
agricultural production and other ecosystem services such assediment regulation (Swallow et al., 2009) and native species
persistence (Barraquand and Martinet, 2011). When changing
agricultural land use back to natural ecosystems through
restoration, trade-offs have been found between achieving
salinity and biodiversity objectives (Maron and Cockfield,
2008), and between carbon sequestration and a range of other
services including biodiversity (Crossman et al., 2011b; Nelson
et al., 2008), food (Nelson et al., 2010; Paterson and Bryan, 2012),
and water (Chisholm, 2010) objectives (Fig. 3d). When multiple
ecosystem services are considered, more efficient outcomes
can be achieved where the net gains of land use change are
maximized (Chen et al., 2010; Crossman and Bryan, 2009;
Nelson et al., 2008; Wainger et al., 2010).
4. Incentives, land use change, and ecosystem
services
Incentives are commonly designed to address a single
ecosystem service following the Tinbergen principle (Tinber-
gen, 1952). The rationale is that individual policy instruments
can rarely achieve multiple policy objectives efficiently (e.g.,
Fig. 3 – Australian examples of ecosystem services incentives with co-benefits and trade-offs. (a) Rice harvesting in the
Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area, near Griffith, New South Wales. Rice and other crops such as cotton are opportunistic crops
grown in wet seasons in Australia. By using surplus water to produce food and fiber services the trade-offs of reduced
environmental flows for riparian ecosystems are minimized (photograph courtesy Willem van Aken). (b) Fire is a regular
occurrence in the savannah ecosystems of northern Australia with implications for several ecosystem services dependent
upon the season and hence, intensity of fire. Prescribed burning is actively used to reintroduce low intensity fire to the
landscape which can enhance conservation values, protect property, improve cattle pasture, reduce carbon emissions, and
involve Aboriginal traditional owners (photograph courtesy CSIRO Ecosystem Sciences). (c) Barley crop growing near
Adelaide, South Australia. Natural ecosystems and the services they provide have been largely replaced by cereal cropping
and livestock grazing for the production of food and fiber in the agricultural regions of southern Australia (photograph
courtesy Christine Painter). (d) An ecological restoration project in bushland, Keilor, Victoria. With appropriate institutional
rules in place, a carbon market could encourage large areas of ecological restoration with co-benefits for both carbon
sequestration and biodiversity. Other benefits may include reduced erosion and sedimentation. However, caution is
required to avoid impacts on food and fresh water services (photograph courtesy Nick Pitsas). (e) Tasmanian blue gum
(Eucalyptus globulus) plantations growing on farmland in south-western Australia (8 years-old). Around 1 million hectares
have been planted across southern Australia since 1998 following taxation incentives provided under the Managed
Investment Act. Plantations provide carbon sequestration, timber, and some biodiversity benefits but reduce
environmental flows and fresh water for human needs, and preclude agricultural production on the same land (photograph
courtesy T. Grove). (f) A stockman musters cattle on Belmont Station in central Queensland. Beef cattle are one of the main
agricultural industries across northern Australia, an industry strategically placed to service expanding markets in Asia. In
response to emerging carbon market, the trade-off – significant greenhouse gas (methane) emissions from cattle, are being
minimized through herd management and diet which is a focus of ongoing research (photograph courtesy CSIRO Livestock
Industries).
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unanticipated consequences beyond their primary objective
(Merton, 1936) (Fig. 4). The complexity of linkages makes this
especially acute in the context of incentives for ecosystem
services. As trade-offs between services in agro-ecosystems
are common over space and time (Rodriguez et al., 2006), the
failure to consider broad impacts in the design of incentives
often leads to outcomes that are to the detriment of society.
Unintended negative consequences of incentives for
ecosystem services have been reported many times
(Fig. 3e). For example, subsidies for motivating afforestation
of agricultural land have actually been found to reduce
carbon sequestration through shortening economically
optimal rotation times (Tassone et al., 2004). Gren et al.
(2010) found that whilst a single-objective payment for
biodiversity achieved near the maximum possible social
benefit over all services – when compensation was paid for
producing a single non-market service (scenic beauty), the
net social value produced across multiple services de-
creased. Biofuels markets have been found to generate
carbon and energy benefits at the expense of food and fiber
production (Bryan et al., 2010a).
Incentive design is increasingly seeking more efficient
outcomes through bundling payments for multiple ecosystem
services (Deal et al., 2012; Raudsepp-Hearne et al., 2010).
Crossman et al. (2011a) designed a benefits metric for a
conservation auction that included 23 landscape-scale and 14
site-scale indicators of natural capital. Wainger et al. (2010)
targeted invasive species management payments for efficient
production of habitat, property protection, forage, and
hunting services. Wunscher et al. (2008) demonstrated
substantial efficiency gains from targeting auction payments
for scenic beauty, biodiversity, and water services in Costa
Rica. Usually, services for which markets are more difficult to
create (e.g., public goods such as biodiversity) are bundled
with other more easily marketed services (e.g., carbon and
recreation) (Wendland et al., 2010). Bundling can create price
premiums for sellers but may increase transactions costs
associated with monitoring spatially varying services (Kemkes
et al., 2010). The bundling and supply of multiple ecosystem
services has been accepted as a general principle for
ecosystem service markets (Farley and Costanza, 2010).
Commonly, multiple incentives interact – and this affects
changes in land use and management with flow-on impacts for
ecosystem service provision (Fig. 5). Incentives for ecosystem
services such as carbon, water, biodiversity, soil health, and
bioenergy combine with established markets for agricultural
commodities. Each incentive provides a price signal for changes
in land use and management by landholders who make
decisions in response to the totality of economic opportunities
and risks (Fig. 3f). Landholders can take advantage of multiple
markets for ecosystem services by credit stacking – the sale of the
ecosystem services co-benefits generated through a single
change in land use and management into multiple ecosystem
services markets (Deal et al., 2012). However, incentive
interactions are much more complex than this. Often uncon-
sidered in credit stacking are the costs associated with
ecosystem services trade-offs. Thus, to use the example of
Deal et al. (2012), whilst a landholder restoring a hectare of
riparian forest may be able to produce, stack, and sell creditssimultaneously into water quality, carbon, and biodiversity
markets, costs may also accrue to account for adversely
impacted services such as a decrease in run-off.
Thus, whilst some incentives pull together toward achiev-
ing a policy objective synergistically, other instruments pull
against each other, creating tensions. Several examples of
tensions between incentives have been reported. The US
federal Conservation Reserve Program paid people to retire
environmentally sensitive land from agriculture whilst other
federal farm subsidies sought to encourage agriculture. By
raising the profitability of cropland through subsidies, the
government directly competed with itself in providing
incentives for landowners to retire land (Lubowski et al.,
2008). A carbon price incentive was found to be less effective in
motivating land use change when the costs of water used by
reforested areas was accounted for (Chisholm, 2010). In the US,
federal flood control and drainage programs provided oppor-
tunities for large scale conversion of wetlands to agriculture,
working against wetland protection policies under the Clean
Water Act (Stavins and Jaffe, 1990). Bryan and Kandulu (2011)
documented a tension between taxation incentives that
encourage landholders to increase cattle stocking densities
and natural resource management payments aimed at
sustainable land management.
In an integrated assessment of multiple incentives, land
uses, and ecosystem services, Bryan and Crossman (submitted
for publication) found complex interaction effects. Incentives
for agricultural commodities, carbon, water, and biodiversity
displayed synergies and tensions in their effect on food and
fiber, carbon, water, and habitat services through their
influence on agriculture and reforestation land uses (Fig. 5).
The effects of incentive interactions across multiple ecosys-
tem services were found to include non-linearities, inter-
dependencies, and threshold effects (Bryan and Crossman,
submitted for publication) (Fig. 6). These impacts of incentive
interactions across multiple ecosystem services suggests that
full knowledge of these consequences is essential to efficiently
realize opportunities for synergies and minimize tensions.
Bryan and Crossman (submitted for publication) however, did
not assess feedbacks from changes in ecosystem service
supply on incentive pricing (Fig. 1).
5. Directions for quantifying the influence of
incentives on ecosystem services
To adequately quantify the complex influence of incentives on
ecosystem services via land use change, the linkages in Fig. 1
need to be specifically addressed. We need to address the
challenges of quantifying the influence of incentives on land
use change, quantifying the impact of land use change on
ecosystem services, and quantifying feedbacks from changes
in ecosystem service supply on incentive prices. Below I
discuss progress against these challenges and suggest priori-
ties for future research.
Modeling the impact of incentives on land use change is
based on the premise that regional patterns of land use change
in agro-ecosystems emerge from micro-level land-use deci-
sions by individual landholders. Incentives, with appropriate
institutional support (e.g., regulatory frameworks and
Fig. 4 – A synthesis of the production of multiple ecosystem services following land use change under various incentive
prices for agricultural commodities, carbon, water, and biodiversity in the 15 million hectare agricultural region of South
Australia as simulated under the median cost scenario of Bryan and Crossman (submitted for publication). The larger the
fan blades and the deeper their color, the more of the ecosystem service provided. The fan blade lengths are relative, being
linearly rescaled between the overall maximum and minimum values across 1875 scenarios, and include the minimum,
median, and maximum scores representing the variation in ecosystem service provision. In this case study, markets affect
the profitability and economic viability of three land uses – agriculture (wheat/sheep), carbon plantings, and environmental
plantings. The spatial distribution of the most profitable land uses changes under different incentive price levels for
agricultural commodities, carbon, water, and biodiversity – and this affects the provision of ecosystem services. An
increase in agricultural commodity prices decreases the amount of carbon sequestered and habitat restored whilst
increasing food production and fresh water provisioning. An increase in carbon price has the opposite effect. Increasing
water price has a weak influence on increasing provision of fresh water with negligible influence on the other services.
Likewise, increasing biodiversity price increases the provision of habitat services exclusively. (For interpretation of the
references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of the article.)
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Fig. 5 – Interactions between incentives and the effects on ecosystem services in the South Australian agricultural regions
summarized from Bryan and Crossman (submitted for publication).
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 2 7 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 1 2 4 – 1 3 4130information), change the relative profitability of land uses and
provide a price signal for landholders to change land use (Irwin
and Geoghegan, 2001; Lewis et al., 2011; Lubowski et al., 2008).
Carbon markets, in particular, can provide economic oppor-
tunities for landholders to convert agricultural land to tree-
based land uses (Alig et al., 2010; Bryan et al., 2008; Harper
et al., 2007). Alig et al. (2010) found that carbon-related
payments to landowners can have substantial impacts onFig. 6 – Interaction between a biodiversity payment and a
carbon price incentive and the effect on the supply of
habitat services, through motivating widespread adoption
of environmental plantings in the 15 million hectare
agricultural region of South Australia. At a low carbon
price (=20$/tCO2Se), very high biodiversity payments were
required to induce adoption of environmental plantings in
high priority areas. At higher carbon prices, a biodiversity
payment is an economically effective tool for motivating
adoption.future patterns of forestry and agricultural land use, levels of
terrestrial carbon sequestration, forest resource conditions,
agricultural production trends, and bioenergy production.
Conversely, reductions in agricultural prices can also lead to
the retirement of agricultural land and conversion to forest
(Vuichard et al., 2008). Profitability has been widely used to
evaluate the competitiveness of alternative land uses (Hunt,
2008; Maraseni and Cockfield, 2011; Wise and Cacho, 2011) and
to quantify the impact of incentives on ecosystem services
(Antle and Stoorvogel, 2006; Bryan et al., 2010b, 2008; Dymond
et al., 2012; Polasky et al., 2008; Townsend et al., 2012).
Variation in economic parameters including discount rates,
upfront establishment costs, and ongoing transactions and
maintenance costs are well known to affect economic returns
from land use (Bryan et al., 2008).
However, whilst profitability is known to be a major
driver of land use change and adoption of conservation
technologies (Lubowski et al., 2008), a range of other less-
well-known factors are also important. Uncertainty, risk,
and option values are important given the uncertainty and
irreversibility of investment in land use change, con-
straints on labor and capital, and a range of other
unmodeled costs and benefits all affect the magnitude
and rate of potential land use change (Lubowski et al., 2008;
Stavins, 1999). These factors can result in less land use
change than would be predicted by economic theory and
cause the undersupply of ecosystem services. However,
whilst most landholders may be unwilling to reforest their
land without financial incentives – for some, the level of
incentive required could be less than the net returns to
current agricultural activities on marginal agricultural land
(Shaikh et al., 2007), as they receive benefits from growing
trees that are not captured in market transactions. These
benefits relate to potential reductions in risk from assured
annual payments, and the provision of ecosystem services
particularly those that may help sustain agricultural
production, but also aesthetic benefits, bequest value,
and other benefits.
The many determinants of land use change make predict-
ing land use change decisions in response to incentives
extremely challenging. Previous studies have used a revealed
preference econometric approach based on data from
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capture the effects of incentives on land use change and
ecosystem services (Busch et al., 2012; Lewis et al., 2011;
Lubowski et al., 2006; Nelson et al., 2008). The two great
advantages of the revealed preference approach lie in its
empirical basis and its inherent ability to capture the influence
of multiple drivers in projecting land use change. There are
however, two outstanding questions about its application.
Firstly, to what extent is the past able to predict the future? A
complex systems view of land use suggests that non-linear
effects such as surprises, dependencies, and threshold effects
may limit the predictability of past responses and demand
new approaches to land use change analyses (Briassoulis,
2008; Dawson et al., 2010; Parker et al., 2008; Parrott and Meyer,
2012). Secondly, for most regions, the data required to build
revealed preference models do not exist. To compensate for
this, minimum data methods have been developed. Compared
to revealed preference approaches, minimum data methods
can provide land use change models acceptable for use in
policy analysis (Antle and Valdivia, 2006). New methods
combining the strengths of complex systems and econometric
approaches are urgently required to support future assess-
ments of market impacts on land use and ecosystem services.
In modeling the impact of changes in land use and
management on ecosystem services, substantial recent
advances have been made and this is where the science
underpinning the linkages in Fig. 1 is most developed. Several
studies have measured, mapped, and modeled the spatial
distribution of ecosystem services produced from various land
uses and these efforts have recently increased in sophistica-
tion. For example, biophysical process models have been
commonly used to map provisioning and regulating services
such as food, bioenergy, water, and carbon (Crossman and
Bryan, 2009; Crossman et al., 2011b; Paterson and Bryan, 2012;
Stoms et al., 2012). Recent calls have been made for advances
in the mapping of cultural services (Chan et al., 2012; Daniel
et al., 2012). More sophisticated spatial properties such as
supply, demand, flow, beneficiaries, and benefits transfer have
been incorporated into the mapping of ecosystem services and
quantifying their benefits and costs (Burkhard et al., 2012;
Crossman et al., submitted for publication; Eigenbrod et al.,
2010; Fisher et al., 2011; Syrbe and Walz, 2012). More focused
progress in mapping the impact of land use change on
ecosystem services is required for the accurate and meaning-
ful assessment of the impact of market-based policy incen-
tives.
To complement these advances, we also need to capture
the dynamic feedback relationships between ecosystem
service supply and incentive prices. This is where the science
required to underpin the linkages in Fig. 1 is least developed.
Prices for marketed services such as agricultural commodi-
ties are dynamic, responding to relative changes in supply
and demand (Fig. 1). For example, given a constant demand, a
decrease in the supply of wheat production through land use
change such as the reforestation of agricultural land will
place upward pressure on wheat prices (Wright, 2012).
Incentives for non-marketed services can be also designed
with flexible (or elastic) prices (e.g., as cap and trade
instruments) that respond to changes in supply and demand
of ecosystem services (Sterner, 2003). To apply the sameeconomic principles to non-marketed services – in a water
market for example, water prices should respond to the
scarcity of the resource. Prices should increase in times of
drought, thereby discouraging use and encouraging efficiency
in irrigated agriculture, and ensuring flows for the continued
production of other services from water-dependent ecosys-
tems. Conversely, in wet periods, falling water prices signal
increased availability of fresh water services for irrigation
and other human uses. Such price elasticities in water
markets have been reported in Australia’s Goulburn–Murray
district (Wheeler et al., 2008) and the US Rio Grande (De
Mouche et al., 2011). Working efficiently, the theoretical
outcome of these market forces will be a socially optimal
supply of ecosystem services. However, this often fails in
practice due to many factors including thin markets,
differences in scale, levels of information, price volatility
and risk, leakage, and institutional design (De Mouche et al.,
2011; Sovacool, 2011). Incentive price dynamics, feedbacks,
and market behavior needs to be quantified using partial and
general equilibrium models (van der Werf and Peterson, 2009)
for a complete understanding of the influence of incentives
on land use and ecosystem services. This is a frontier of
ecosystem services science.
6. Conclusion
Market-based incentives are widely used to govern the supply
of ecosystem services from agro-ecosystems. In particular,
incentives such as payments for ecosystem services are
increasingly used to rebalance the supply of non-marketed
services. The influence of incentives on ecosystem services is
indirect, occurring through their ability to motivate changes
in land use and management. I have shown that the
relationships between incentives and land use, and between
land use and ecosystem services are complex. These relation-
ships may be one-to-many, many-to-one, or many-to-many.
These relationships can be non-linear and vary across both
space and time. Multiple incentives interact, with synergies
and tensions in their influence on multiple ecosystem
services. Depending on incentive design, there may also be
a dynamic feedback on price through changes in the supply of
ecosystem services. Whilst many studies have addressed
individual components, no studies have attempted an
integrated assessment of the interactions between multiple
incentives, land uses, and ecosystem services. I discussed the
need for continued advancement in three areas: quantifying
the link between incentives and land use change decisions;
quantifying the impact of land use change on ecosystem
services, and; quantifying the dynamic incentive price feed-
backs from changes in ecosystem service supply. These
developments are badly needed to support the design of
incentives that can capture the synergistic effects and avoid
tensions between incentives in their influence on ecosystem
services.
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